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(VENICE COMMISSION)

UKRAINE

URGENT JOINT OPINION

OF THE VENICE COMMISSION

**AND THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND RULE OF LAW (DGI)
OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE**

**ON THE LEGISLATIVE SITUATION
REGARDING ANTI-CORRUPTION MECHANISMS
FOLLOWING DECISION No. 13-R/2020
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF UKRAINE**

**Issued pursuant to Article 14a
of the Venice Commission's Rules of Procedure on 9 December 2021**

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on the basis of comments by
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I. Introduction

1. On 25 November 2020, following exchanges with the President of the Venice Commission, the President of Ukraine, Mr Volodymyr Zelenskyy, requested an urgent opinion of the Venice Commission on the constitutional situation created by decision no. 13-r/2020 of 27 October 2020 of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. In his request, Mr Zelenskyy formulated three questions to the Venice Commission: he asked the Venice Commission to issue an opinion “on the state of anti-corruption legislation after this judgment; the judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine issuing a judgment while possibly being in a conflict of interest situation; the Constitutional Court of Ukraine’s compliance with the due process of law in hearing the case and resolving the matter, including with regard to its reasonableness and respect for the limits of the constitutional petition.”
2. In his letter Mr Zelenskyy argued that the decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine “irreparably compromised” the proper functioning of the State’s anti-corruption infrastructure and “created a major constitutional crisis”. Against this background, on 25 November 2020, the Bureau of the Venice Commission accepted the request for an urgent opinion and decided to divide the subject-matter of the request in two separate urgent opinions.
3. This urgent opinion deals with the first question, namely with the state of anti-corruption legislation after decision no. 13-r/2020 of 27 October 2020. The two other questions formulated in the President’s request are dealt with in a separate urgent opinion (CDL-PI(2020)019).
4. This urgent opinion has been prepared jointly with the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law (“DG I”) of the Council of Europe. Ms Hanna Suchocka (Honorary President, former member, Poland), Mr Nicolae Esanu (substitute member, the Republic of Moldova) and Mr Martin Kuijer (substitute member, the Netherlands) acted as rapporteurs for this opinion on behalf of the Venice Commission, Mr Đuro Sessa acted as an expert for the Action against Crime Department of the DG I, and Mr Gerhard Reissner acted as an expert for the Justice and Legal Cooperation Department of the DG I.
5. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, no visit to Kyiv was possible, but video conferences were held on 2 December 2020 with the Office of the President of Ukraine, the President’s Commission on Legal Reform, the Committee on Legal Policy of the Verkhovna Rada, the National Agency for the Corruption Prevention, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, the High Council of Justice, as well as with representatives of the civil society and of international organisations and diplomatic missions active in Ukraine. The Venice Commission is grateful to the Council of Europe Office in Ukraine for the excellent organisation of the videoconferences.
6. This opinion was prepared in reliance on the English translation of the relevant legislation and the decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. The translation may not accurately reflect the original version on all points.
7. This urgent opinion was issued pursuant to the Venice Commission’s Protocol on the preparation of urgent opinions (CDL-AD(2018)019) and was endorsed by the Venice Commission at its 125th online Plenary Session, 11-12 December 2020.

II. Background

A. Outline of decision no. 13-r/2020 of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (the CCU) and reactions to it

8. In 2020 the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (the CCU) adopted several decisions which affected the operation of the anti-corruption bodies, namely the National Anti-Corruption Bureau

(the NABU), which is in charge of criminal investigations in the sphere of anti-corruption,¹ and the National Agency for the Corruption Prevention (the NACP), which deals, among other functions, with the verification (audit) of financial declarations of public officials.² The focus of this urgent opinion will be the last of those decisions, namely decision no. 13-r/2020 of 27 October 2020.³ By this decision the CCU invalidated as unconstitutional certain provisions of the Law of Ukraine “On the Prevention of Corruption”⁴ concerning the powers of the NACP to verify the accuracy of the financial declarations submitted by public officials, and Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, which provides for criminal liability for submitting false declarations/failure to submit a declaration.

9. Following decision no. 13-r/2020, the NACP announced its inability to perform inspections of certain State-owned enterprises and institutions. The NABU declared that cases regarding inaccurate declaration of assets had to be closed, and public officials convicted of abuse would thus evade liability. Reportedly, over a hundred criminal cases investigated by the NABU have been dropped.

10. Decision no. 13-4/2020 was met with stark disapproval from a part of the population and of the political class. President Zelenskyy publicly criticised the CCU and proposed draft legislation (Draft Law no. 4288) which would overturn the contested decisions, reinstate the provisions of the legislation invalidated by the CCU and dismiss judges of the CCU. Other legislative proposals were made aimed at reforming the rules on the operation of the CCU. The Venice Commission emphasises that in the present urgent Opinion it will not examine legislative proposals made by various political actors in response to decision no. 13-r/2000, or draft laws which are now in the process of adoption.

B. Status and powers of the NACP before decision no. 13-r/2020 of the CCU

11. The NACP was established by the Law on Prevention of Corruption of 2014 (hereinafter – the 2014 Law; in 2019 the 2014 Law has been amended in order to reinvigorate the anti-corruption effort).⁵ The Chairperson of the NACP is appointed by the government following a competition, organised by the Competition Commission, which includes representatives of the government and members appointed by international partners of Ukraine. The mandate of the Chairperson may be terminated in the case of his/her “inefficiency” (Article 5 (5) (9)) by a Commission on the independent assessment of effectiveness of the NACP, also established with participation of international partners (Article 14 (4)).

12. The 2014 Law, besides establishing the NACP, regulates a broad range of substantive and procedural questions. First of all, it defines the rules of professional conduct⁶ for public officials, for example, as regards acceptance of gifts (Article 23 et seq.) or rules to follow in a situation of conflict of interests (Article 28 et seq.). Most importantly for the purposes of the present urgent opinion, the 2014 Law establishes the duty of all public officials to publish annual financial declarations (Article 45) and to notify the NACP about important acquisitions or expenditures (Article 52). The 2014 Law describes in great detail what sort of information should be entered into the financial declaration, how it should be published, corrected, etc. These declarations are

¹ The NABU is a “state law enforcement agency” which counteracts criminal corruption offenses, through conducting pre-trial investigation in criminal proceedings, public and covert operative search activities, etc. The status and powers of NABU are regulated by a special law, partly invalidated by the CCU in decision no. 11-r/2020 of 16 October 2020 with a deadline to 16 December to align the legislation to the judgment.

² For more information about the composition, functions and powers of this body see Section B below

³ See Venice Commission, CDL-REF(2020)078, [Ukraine - Decision No. 13-r/2020 of the Constitution Court of Ukraine of 27 October 2020, with dissenting opinions](#)

⁴ See Venice Commission, CDL-REF(2020)79, [Ukraine - Law on Prevention of Corruption of 2014, as amended](#). The provisions which have been declared unconstitutional are marked with a strikethrough.

⁵ Also partly invalidated by the CCU in 2020, by decision no. 13-r/2020.

⁶ They are called “ethical” rules in the English translation of the Law of 2014; however, the Venice Commission prefers to call them “rules of conduct” to stress their mandatory character.

to be filled in and submitted electronically and are accessible via a digital system accessible for the public and permitting quick and automated comparison with data contained in other electronic registers: they are often referred to as e-declarations.

13. Under the 2014 Law, the main function of the NACP is to ensure that public officials comply with those rules. The NACP “monitors and controls over implementation of legislation on ethical behaviour, the prevention and settlement of conflicts of interest” (Article 11 (1) (6)), verifies financial declarations of public officials (Article 48), checks whether declarations have been submitted in a timely manner (Article 49), and whether they accurately reflect the financial situation of the official concerned, whether all assets, benefits and interests are properly reflected therein (Article 50). The process of verification may concern family members of the declarants (Article 50 (1) part 4) and is based on various sources of information: it is primarily conducted by comparing the e-declarations with known data in other government databanks (Tax Office, Chamber of Commerce, etc), but the verification can also be based on press reports, information obtained from private persons and legal entities, etc. Article 51 of the 2014 Law empowers the NACP to monitor the “lifestyle” of the public officials, in order to check whether it corresponds to the officially declared financial situation. In case such verification or monitoring of the lifestyle results in detecting some “unjustified assets”, the NACP must notify the NABU and the Special Anti-corruption Prosecution Office accordingly.

14. To verify financial declarations and to enable the NACP to monitor the “lifestyle” of public officials, the NACP may, under Article 12, “obtain information” from government bodies and private persons, “including restricted information, as may be necessary to fulfil its objectives”, have “direct access to information and telecommunication and reference systems, registers, databases, including those containing restricted information” administered by public authorities; can “receive statements” from private individuals or obtain their “written explanations”, “inspect work organisation” of public entities in the area of the fight against corruption, initiate proceedings before other anti-corruption bodies or (see Article 12 (2)) seek bringing those responsible to “statutory liability”. Article 12 (2) proclaims that “a precept issued by the NACP shall be binding”.⁷

15. Following the verification, the NACP may issue a “protocol” which identifies irregularities in the declaration of a public official. Depending on the character of those irregularities, this protocol is communicated, together with the supporting materials, to the competent authority for decision. The NACP itself cannot impose a sanction on the official who failed to submit a declaration or declare assets; however, the protocol may trigger appropriate proceedings: administrative, in the case of minor transgressions, or criminal, if the irregularities are serious enough as to fall under Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code on the submission of a knowingly false declaration (invalidated by the CCU – see below), or if there is evidence of another crime (bribery, for example). In both cases the final decision belongs to a court, administrative or criminal, and not to the NACP. As to the disciplinary liability, the protocol of verification of the declaration may also be used in disciplinary proceedings against the public official concerned.

⁷ Article 13 (2) describes in further detail the powers of the agents of the NACP: to have access to the premises of public bodies and have access to documents or other materials “as may be necessary to conduct inspections”; to “demand any necessary documents or other information in connection with the exercise of their powers, subject to the restrictions established by law”, to “carry out inspections” etc.

C. Powers of the NACP vis-à-vis judges before decision no. 13-r/2020 of the CCU

16. The powers of the NACP extend to judges of ordinary courts and judges of the CCU (both categories are mentioned in Article 3 (1) (e) of the 2014 Law).⁸ The 2014 Law specifies in several places that judges may be governed by special rules – for example, as regards the conflict of interests (Article 35), or as regards inspections of the financial situation of candidates to judicial positions (Article 56 (2)). However, otherwise the 2014 Law does not make a distinction between judges and other public officials.

17. Judges are granted additional guarantees under the Law on the Organisation of Courts and the Status of Judges,⁹ the Law on the High Council of Justice¹⁰ and the Constitution itself (see Article 131 of the Constitution, or Article 149-1 as regards judges of the CCU). Most importantly, a judge may be suspended, dismissed or taken into custody only following a decision by the High Council of Justice (the HCJ). A judge of the CCU may be detained only following a decision of the CCU, and is dismissed only by a decision of the CCU taken by 2/3 of the judges (Article 149-1 of the Constitution). Thus, in theory, protocols drawn up by the NACP in respect of judges of ordinary courts may be transmitted for decision to the HCJ, which is entitled to take disciplinary measures including the dismissal of a judge (as regards judges of the CCU this power belongs to the CCU itself), but in practice such protocols have not resulted in any actual dismissal of a judge to date.

D. Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code (submitting false financial declaration) before decision no. 13-r/2020 of the CCU

18. Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code, declared unconstitutional by decision no. 13, reads as follows:

“Submission by the subject of declaration of knowingly false information in the declaration of a person authorized to perform functions of the state or local self-government as provided for by the Law of Ukraine "On Prevention of Corruption", or intentional failure by the subject of declaration to submit the aforementioned declaration –

shall be punishable by a fine of 2,500 to 3,000 non-taxable minimum incomes of citizens, or community service for a term of 150 to 240 hours, or imprisonment for a term of up to two years, with deprivation of the right to occupy certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to three years.

Note. Subjects of declaration shall mean persons, who under paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 45 of the Law of Ukraine "On Prevention of Corruption", are obliged to submit a declaration of the person authorized to perform functions of the state or local self-government. The responsibility under this Article for submission by the subject of declaration of knowingly false information in the declaration in respect of property or other declaration object of value shall occur if such information differs from reliable information by the amount that exceeds 250 subsistence wages for able-bodied persons.”¹¹

⁸ Although in the Ukrainian legal order judges of the CCU are not considered as a part of the country’s judiciary, for most purposes the 2014 Law treats them the same; therefore, unless indicated specifically, the term “judge” in this urgent Opinion refers to judges of ordinary courts and judges of the CCU.

⁹ See Venice Commission, [CDL-REF\(2020\)068, Ukraine - Law on the Organisation of Courts and the Status of Judges](#).

¹⁰ See Venice Commission, [CDL-REF\(2020\)067, Ukraine - Law on the High Council of Justice](#)

¹¹ Which is an approximate equivalent of EUR 37,500 at the moment.

III. Analysis

A. Approach of the Venice Commission to the situation following decision no. 13-r/2020

19. On 31 October 2020 the President of the Venice Commission and the President of GRECO wrote a joint letter to the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada.¹² In that letter they stressed the importance of fighting corruption, in particular within the judiciary, but at the same time emphasised the role of a Constitutional Court as gatekeeper of the Constitution. This letter fully embodies the position of the Venice Commission. “Disregarding a judgment of a Constitutional Court is equivalent to disregarding the Constitution and the Constituent Power, which attributed the competence to ensure this supremacy to the Constitutional Court”.¹³

20. That does not mean that constitutional courts are beyond reproach and can never make a mistake.¹⁴ The Venice Commission notes, in this specific context, that there are serious allegations (examined further below and in the second urgent opinion dealing with other questions put by the President of Ukraine in his request) that the CCU did not respect its own procedures and that some of the judges of the CCU performed judicial functions while a possible conflict of interests may have resulted in objectively justified fears as to their impartiality. The Venice Commission’s own analysis (see below) reveals that the CCU’s reasoning is flawed in many respects. That decision may produce critical adverse effects for the functioning of anti-corruption bodies, which is extremely worrying.

21. Parliament and the executive, however, must respect the role of the Constitutional Court as the “gatekeeper of the Constitution”. The fight against corruption is an essential element in a state governed by the Rule of law, but so is respect for the Constitution and for constitutional justice. They go hand in hand. Parliament and the Executive must “take into account the arguments used by the Constitutional Court” and “fill legislative/regulatory gaps identified by the Constitutional Court [...] within a reasonable time”.¹⁵

22. While the Ukrainian legislature should execute the decision of the CCU, it should also take into account the principle set out in Article 9 of the Constitution of Ukraine that “international treaties that are in force, agreed to be binding by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, are part of the national legislation of Ukraine”.¹⁶ Positive obligations of the State in this area may stem indirectly from human rights treaties,¹⁷ but stem more directly from international treaties in the sphere of the fight against corruption – like the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (1999),¹⁸ signed and ratified by Ukraine. The international standards of judicial independence and governance of

¹² See here:

https://www.venice.coe.int/files/2020_10_31_UKR_JointGRECOVeniceCommissionLetterSpeakerVerkhovnaRada.pdf

¹³ See Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2017)003, Spain - Opinion on the law of 16 October 2015 amending the Organic Law No. 2/1979 on the Constitutional Court, para. 69

¹⁴ See CDL-AD(2019)012, Republic of Moldova - Opinion on the constitutional situation with particular reference to the possibility of dissolving parliament, paras, 34, 43 and 50.

¹⁵ See Venice Commission, Rule of Law Checklist, E.3.iii and iv

¹⁶ See also Article 92-2 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine: “The Constitutional Court may develop and elaborate a legal position of the Court in its subsequent acts, change its legal position in the event of substantial change to normative regulations that the Court was guided by when expressing such position, or in the presence of objective grounds for the need to improve the protection of constitutional rights and freedoms, *taking into account Ukraine’s international obligations*, subject to substantiation of such change in the Court’s act” (emphasis added).

¹⁷ As stressed in the 2018 Opinion on Romania, “a State is under a positive obligation to ensure that its criminal system is effective in the fight against serious forms of crime, that criminal law constitutes a strong deterrent to commit such offences, and that perpetrators of such offences do not enjoy impunity” – see the Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2018)021, Romania - Opinion on draft amendments to the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, para. 31.

¹⁸ ETS No. 173.

the judiciary – both hard and soft law standards – should also be taken into account by the Verkhovna Rada when interpreting the decision of the CCU.

23. In sum, the purpose of the present urgent Opinion is to help identify possible legislative amendments which would implement decision no. 13-r/2020 of the CCU in line with the Constitution and international standards, while, at the same time, preserving the anti-corruption mechanisms and not impeding the fight against corruption in Ukraine.

B. Procedure before the CCU

24. On 27 October 2020 the CCU (sitting as a Grand Chamber, composed of 15 judges) on a motion filed by 47 MPs, adopted the decision which is at the focus of the present opinion. This decision nullified Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code, which provides for the criminal liability for inaccurate asset declaration by public officials/failure to submit a declaration, and also invalidated some important powers of the NACP, as defined by the 2014 Law. Four dissenting opinions were written by Justices Holovaty, Lemak, Pervomaiskyi and Kolisnyk.

25. Many of the interlocutors met by the rapporteurs complained about various procedural irregularities which accompanied the adoption of decision no. 13-r/2020. For example, it was adopted with unusual speed: it took the CCU only a few weeks to examine the constitutional complaint introduced by a group of MPs. This is a very short time in comparison to the usual duration of such proceedings before the CCU, especially in light of the large amount of supporting material the CCU had to assess, and the magnitude of the underlying questions. A public hearing was scheduled, but later cancelled and replaced with a written procedure.¹⁹ The CCU went far beyond the petition it was considering, thus expanding its scope of review: the CCU declared unconstitutional several articles of the 2014 Law which were not mentioned in the petition.

26. Most importantly, several judges of the CCU (including the judge-rapporteur) were in possible conflict of interest. The NACP had detected irregularities in their financial declarations, and cases had been transmitted to the NABU for further criminal investigation. The invalidation of Article 366-1 and of the provisions in the 2014 Law on financial declarations put an end to those further investigations into the financial declarations of the said judges and thus directly benefited them. The question of the possible conflict of interest was raised by the President's Office in the proceedings before the CCU but there is no mention of it in the judgment, let alone of an explanation of why the CCU disregarded it. The CCU did adopt six procedural rulings (not published on the web-site of the CCU nor apparently made accessible to the general public otherwise) concerning four judges, including the judge rapporteur and the President of the CCU, whereby it dismissed the recusal requests in a standardised summary manner. The only reasoning given by the CCU in its rulings – in respect of all judges concerned – was that “the motives [for recusal] indicated in the request [by the President's Office] do not disclose the presence of grounds which would cast doubt as to the objectiveness and impartiality” of the respective judge. According to the Constitutional Court, these rulings will be made public at some point, when proceedings in the case are finished.

27. In the Commission's view, it is striking that the matter of conflict of interest was not addressed in any meaningful manner by the Court, that no serious in-depth reasons for refusing the request for recusal were given, and that the Court's rulings were not made available to the general public when the main decision was published, or at least shortly thereafter. Serious and very specific allegations of a possible conflict of interest should never be discarded in a summary manner. The Venice Commission reiterates that the legitimacy of a Constitutional Court does not stem solely from the constitutional and legal provisions which define the Court's powers. It also depends on the persuasive force of the court's reasons for its decisions, and on the painstaking respect for procedural rules by the court. The fact that the decision was adopted so quickly, without a public

¹⁹ The CCU justified this decision by the need to meet Covid-19-related measures applicable in Ukraine at the time.

hearing, that the CCU extended the scope of the original petition, and that it did so without engaging with a very serious allegation of a possible conflict of interest, seriously calls into question the manner in which the CCU operated in this case and will affect the public perception of the institution.

28. The Venice Commission will now turn to the examination of the reasoning of decision no. 13 and its effects on the anti-corruption legislation. Decision no. 13 can be divided into two parts: one concerning the investigative powers of the NACP in relation to the verification of financial declaration (by judges), and another concerning Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code establishing the liability for false declarations/failure to declare. The Venice Commission will examine these two questions separately, and will start with Article 366-1.

C. Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code

29. Decision no. 13-r/2020 in this part (see section 17 et seq. of the decision) contends in the first place that the offence of “submitting a false declaration” should not be punished by means of criminal legislation. The CCU based its conclusion on the fundamental principle of proportionality. The most relevant parts of the decision read as follows: “Criminalization of a specific human act is possible provided that it meets, in particular, a set of such criteria: significant social threat of the act; the spread of similar acts in society; ineffectiveness of other sectoral legal means of influencing these actions; the impossibility of successfully combating the act with less repressive methods.” The criminal offence contained in Article 366-1 was introduced “in the absence of grounds for this, and as a result, the crime is an act that is not objectively so”. The acts defined in Article 366-1 “are not capable of causing significant harm to a natural or legal person, society or the state” to be criminalised. The CCU considers “that the declaration of knowingly unreliable information in the declaration, as well as the intentional failure of the subject of the declaration to declare should be grounds for other types of legal liability”.

30. This first argument of the CCU deserves a detailed examination. It is open for a constitutional court to find that a criminal sanction applied in a specific case limits in a disproportionate manner the exercise of a constitutionally protected fundamental right – for example, the freedom of speech, the right to privacy, etc. – or, where the review is *in abstracto*, goes against a fundamental principle of law or international standard. However, in Ukraine the duty to submit an accurate financial declaration is an ordinary duty which is attached to the status of a public official. The CCU did not explain in its decision what sort of constitutionally protected public or private interest is disproportionately affected by the sanctions provided by Article 366-1, it simply concluded that this provision is disproportionate as such.

31. The Venice Commission observes that it is a requirement of the separation of powers that a constitutional court should not usurp the role of the legislature. Even when, formally, a constitutional court has the power to declare unconstitutional a provision of the criminal code, this power should be exercised with due regard to the role played by Parliament in a system of checks and balances. According to Article 92 of the Constitution of Ukraine, only laws define acts that are crimes and responsibility for them. In the case at hand the CCU did not invoke any evidence nor develop any specific argument justifying its blanket assertion that submitting a false declaration is “not capable of causing significant harm to a natural or legal person, society or the state”.

32. The CCU argues in the second place that Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code does not correspond to the “requirements of clarity and unambiguity”. According to the CCU, “[...] the use of legal constructions lacking a clear list of laws makes it impossible to unambiguously define the range of subjects of crime, and reference norms make it impossible to establish the range of their addressees. As a result, persons who cannot be parties to the declaration and therefore knowingly failed to do so may be held liable for intentional failure to file a declaration”.

33. The Venice Commission notes at the outset with regret that decision no. 13-r/2020 of the CCU also lacks clarity: the CCU failed to identify which specific parts of Article 366-1 it found to be insufficiently clear. Should it refer to the definition of the class of persons who may be held liable for submitting a false declaration, it follows from the note to Article 366-1 that potential subjects of this crime are those public officials who are under an obligation to submit declarations pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 45 of the 2014 Law. Article 45 is not declared unconstitutional by the CCU for lack of clarity or for any other reason – and, from the Venice Commission’s own perspective, this provision is sufficiently clear: it does not appear that public officials in Ukraine do not know whether or not they are required to submit declarations. Such terms as “knowingly false information” or “intentional failure to submit a declaration” do not appear to the Venice Commission as ambiguous either. In any event, as the CCU reasoning is extremely unspecific, the legislature has a significant margin of manoeuvre in responding to this criticism. The Venice Commission thus recommends the legislature to interpret the CCU’s decision in accordance with the overall constitutional framework of the country and relevant international obligations.

34. Since the central argument of the CCU is the alleged “lack of proportionality” of Article 366-1, more tailor-made sanctions may be provided in the revised provision: for example, the sanction of imprisonment may be reserved only for cases above a certain threshold and for perpetrators acting with deliberate intent. That being said, in the Commission’s view, the level of monetary fines and other sanctions should be sufficiently high as to act as deterrent and as to ensure a punishment which is proportionate to the importance which the fight against corruption has in Ukraine. The sanction of imprisonment should be maintained for the most serious violations. To address the main concern of the CCU in this respect, this differentiation might be codified in the text of the article rather than entrusting the observance of the principle of proportionality entirely to the full discretion of the judge, and the elements permitting to differentiate between crimes of different degrees of gravity should be enumerated there.

35. Decision no. 13-r/2020 in this part represents a serious challenge for the Ukrainian legal order. The unconstitutionality of Article 366-1, declared by the CCU, entails that criminal proceedings instituted under this provision but not completed to date will have to be discontinued. There is a risk that certain people, who would otherwise be convicted for false declarations, will go unpunished. The legislature must reflect how to “fill in” this gap created by the decision of the CCU, and how to ensure the continuity of the system of financial declarations. It can be achieved by strengthening other measures, of a non-criminal character. Alternatively, the facts might be qualified under other, already existing but less specific criminal provisions like forgery of official documents, bribery, embezzlement of public funds, etc.

D. Investigative powers of the NACP

36. Most of the decision under examination is focused on the provisions of the 2014 Law which give the NACP the power to verify financial declarations of public officials, including judges.

37. Decision no. 13-r/2020 restates the principles of the separation of powers, checks and balances, independence of the judiciary, etc. The CCU notes, in particular, that the special position of the judiciary is demonstrated by the rules related to the appointment and accountability of judges. According to the CCU, independence of judges is best ensured through the establishment of a special institution shielding judges from influences and pressures. Influencing a judge in relation to a specific case he/she deals with is impermissible. The CCU argues that the fight against corruption should not affect the independence of the judiciary. Integrity checks should be carried out by competent, independent and impartial bodies and cannot be used as a tool to eliminate politically “undesirable” judges. The decision of the CCU contains numerous references to the provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine, as well as to relevant international law standards, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR), etc.

38. Not all of the references to the international instruments made by the CCU are relevant or accurate (on this see more below). However, generally speaking the Venice Commission agrees that judicial independence is a fundamental principle of any legal order governed by the rule of law. The main question is how to organise the system of judicial governance in order to reduce or even remove completely the risk of external interference with independent decision-making by the judges.

39. When answering this question, the CCU sees a problem when the legislature “empowers bodies and officials outside the judiciary with a significant amount of powers to organise and operate courts, determine the judiciary and status of judges”. “Any forms and methods of control in the form of inspections, monitoring, etc. of the functioning and activity of courts and judges should be implemented only by the judiciary and exclude the establishment of such bodies in both the executive and legislative branches.” The CCU is worried by “the effect of the norms that institutionalise the control powers of the NACP”. The NACP, for the CCU, is an “executive body” and exercises control functions *vis-à-vis* the judges and the CCU judges. That, for the CCU, threatens the judges’ independence. The CCU does not contest the duty of public officials to declare their assets, but special rules should exist in respect of judges. This is the main thrust of decision no. 13-r/2020.

40. In the operative provisions the CCU declares unconstitutional a number of provisions of the 2014 Law, which describe the investigative powers which allowed the NACP to verify declarations and monitor the lifestyle of officials, including judges, get access to state registers, collect information and initiate proceedings in respect of the corruption-related offences (these powers are described in paragraph 13 and 14 above). In essence, the NACP was stripped of most of its investigative powers related to the verification of financial declarations, breaches of rules of conduct and monitoring of the “lifestyle”.

41. Before going further, the Venice Commission notes that in this case the CCU did not use the opportunity provided by Article 91 of the Law on the Constitutional Court,²⁰ which allows for establishing in a decision a time-limit for its implementation by the legislature. In the previous decisions which concerned the status of NABU (see footnote 1 above), the CCU gave the legislature the time – albeit very short – to fix the problems it identified. It is unclear why in decision no. 13-r/2020 the CCU did not do the same. Indeed, there is no general obligation for a constitutional court to postpone the coming into effect of its decision, in order to give the legislature time to fill in the gap created by the invalidation of a statutory rule. In certain circumstances an immediate entry into force of a decision of the constitutional court is not only possible but even desirable. However, delaying the effect of declarations of unconstitutionality may be seen as good practice in the situations when the proper functioning of state institutions or legal mechanisms, otherwise compatible with the Constitution, may be jeopardized by the invalidation of certain isolated provisions of the law. In an opinion on Tunisia the Venice Commission recommended that “the Court should be able to defer the effect of its findings of unconstitutionality, so as to avoid a legal gap following the repeal of a law or of provisions within a law.”²¹ In an opinion on Luxembourg the Venice Commission observed that the possibility of deferring the effect of a judgment is “welcome, not to say essential”.²² While certain isolated statutory provisions can be easily “erased” from the legal order, decision no. 13-r/2020 is much more complex: it requires revisiting the whole mechanism of financial reporting by judges. Therefore, the legislature ought to have been given sufficient time to revisit the system and develop new legal solutions.

²⁰ See here: http://www.ccu.gov.ua/sites/default/files/law_on_ccu_amended_2017_eng.pdf

²¹ See Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2015)024, Opinion on the Draft Institutional Law on the Constitutional Court of Tunisia, para. 11.

²² See Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2019)003, Opinion on the proposed revision of the Constitution of Luxembourg, para 116.

1. Material scope of the CCU's decision no. 13-r/2020

42. For the Venice Commission, the operative part of decision no. 13-r/2020 should be interpreted in the light of its reasoning. Any other approach would make the very idea of a "reasoned judgment" superfluous.²³ In addition, Article 89 of the Law on the CCU stipulates that the decisions of the CCU should be reasoned. Where the reasoning is lacking or insufficient, the legislature should rely on general constitutional principles and international standards. Where the conclusion is contradictory, it should apply logic.

43. Decision no. 13-r/2020 clearly distinguishes between the situation of judges and other public officials. The CCU discusses at length the special role of judges and the special guarantees for their independence. P. 15 gives support to the existing mechanism of financial declarations by stating that "declaring the income of persons exercising public power is an indisputable requirement in any modern democratic state. There is no doubt that public figures in the state must file a declaration of income".

44. However, the operative provisions of the decision seem to invalidate the NACP powers in bulk, even though these provisions of the 2014 Law are applicable not only to judges but to other public officials as well. Thus, the operative provisions do not follow logically from the preceding reasons for judgment. The CCU has informed the Commission that it has severed the proceedings, and that another judgment will be issued in time in respect of some other aspects of this issue. Irrespective of what these additional aspects may be, the conclusion of the CCU is supported by some reasoning only in respect of ordinary and constitutional judges. It follows that only the provisions regarding judges need to be amended in order to comply with decision no. 13-r/2020. The powers of the NACP in relation to other public officials should be reinstated.

2. The power of the NACP to verify judges' declarations

45. It may appear that decision no. 13-r/2020 requires a complete removal of the NACP from the process of verification of declarations of judges. However, looking more closely at the reasoning of the decision, this is not necessarily what is required. The CCU's decision contains numerous references to international and European standards, in particular to the case-law of the ECtHR and to the recommendations of the Consultative Council of European Judges (the CCJE). Thus, the CCU decision should be construed in the light of those and other international standards.

a. From the perspective of international standards and from a comparative perspective

46. The United Nations Convention against Corruption (ratified by Ukraine in 2009) encourages States to introduce a duty of public officials to submit asset declarations, which implies an efficient system of verification (audit) of such declarations.²⁴ At the European level, the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Recommendation No. R(2000)10 on codes of conducts for public

²³ As the Venice Commission stressed in CDL-AD(2008)030, Opinion on the Draft Law on the Constitutional Court of Montenegro, para. 71, "Article 69 obliging other state authorities to take into account the legal reasons of the decision of the Constitutional Court when they adopt a new individual act is also a positive element. Often, the problems with other courts result from the fact that they follow the operative part but not the reasoning of the Constitutional Court."

²⁴ In para. 5 of Article 8 it calls on State parties to "endeavour, where appropriate and in accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law, to establish measures and systems requiring public officials to make declarations to appropriate authorities regarding, inter alia, their outside activities, employment, investments, assets and substantial gifts or benefits from which a conflict of interest may result with respect to their functions as public officials." The Convention further requires that "each State Party shall consider establishing, in accordance with its domestic law, effective financial disclosure systems for appropriate public officials and shall provide for appropriate sanctions for non-compliance. Each State Party shall also consider taking such measures as may be necessary to permit its competent authorities to share that information with the competent authorities in other States Parties when necessary to investigate, claim and recover proceeds of offences established in accordance with this Convention" (para. 5 of Article 52).

officials, recommends Member States introducing an obligation of public officials to declare, at regular intervals, personal or private interests which are likely to be affected by their official duties (p. 14). The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) calls for introducing a duty of public officials to declare assets,²⁵ and, more specifically in respect of Ukraine, expressed support to the obligation for *judges and members of their families* to submit such declarations.²⁶

47. If the duty of public officials to declare their assets and financial interests is uncontroversial, the question of who should verify these financial declarations is a more complex question: there is no single model as to how the verification is to be organised, whether it should be a unique system for all public officials, or separate systems for different categories of them.²⁷ What is clear, however, is that there is no requirement under international standards that judges should be submitted to any special regime in this respect.

48. This plurality of models is acknowledged by the CCJE: in its [Opinion no. 21 \(2018\)](#) on the prevention of corruption amongst judges the CCJE insisted that *disciplinary proceedings* (italics added) should be conducted by a properly composed judicial council or a similar body having a strong judicial component (p. 30). This does not mean, however, that the process of verification of financial declarations of judges should also be in the hands of such bodies. As regards investigative authorities, in para. 50 the CCJE proposes that “it might be necessary to establish specialised investigative bodies and specialised prosecutors to fight corruption among judges”, but it does not express any position about the organisation of bodies which verify the financial declarations.

49. The Venice Commission examined this question in an opinion of 2019 on Armenia,²⁸ where it held as follows:

27. Two solutions are possible in this respect: either to create a special body within the judiciary responsible for checking financial declarations of judges or to entrust this task to an external body which deals with the declarations of all public officials. The first solution is better for judicial independence but lacks transparency, which may give rise to a corporatist behaviour. [...]

28. It is difficult to find a common European standard in these matters. Some documents suggest that only a judicial body should have the power to bring disciplinary cases against judges. Other authorities accept that the verification of the financial statements by the judges may be performed by a body external to the judiciary. [...] In the opinion of the Venice Commission, whether to entrust the task of verifying declarations to an external body (dealing with all public officials, including judges), or to a specialised body within the judiciary, depends on the local realities. [...]”

50. In the Armenian context, the Venice Commission readily accepted the choice made by the legislature, namely that it is an external body – the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption created by Parliament – which verifies financial declarations of judges and, in the case of irregularities, initiates disciplinary proceedings before the Supreme Judicial Council.²⁹

²⁵ See GRECO, [Code of conduct for public officials: GRECO findings & recommendations](#), pp. 13-16.

²⁶ See GRECO, Fourth Evaluation Round: Corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors, Evaluation Report Ukraine, 2017, p. 180.

²⁷ See the OECD study “[Asset Declarations for Public Officials: A Tool to Prevent Corruption](#)”, p. 15.

²⁸ See Venice Commission, [CDL-AD\(2019\)024](#), Armenia - Joint opinion of the Venice Commission and the Directorate of Human Rights (DHR) of the Directorate General of Human Rights, and rule of law (DGI) of the Council of Europe, on the amendments to the Judicial Code and some other laws.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 29.

51. Finally, from a comparative perspective, the model where asset declarations of judges are verified by bodies outside of the judiciary may be regarded as dominant in the region.³⁰ Therefore, whether or not to create a special legal mechanism of verification of declaration of judges is not dictated by international standards, and the previous model – where declarations of judges and other public officials are verified by the same body – is more widespread in the region. That means that the choice of the most appropriate model belongs to the national legislature.

b. From the national constitutional perspective

52. The Constitution of Ukraine is silent on the question of financial declarations of public officials and who should verify them. The CCU based its reasoning on the constitutional principle of judicial independence, claiming that the mechanism of verification of financial declarations by the NACP may be abused to put pressure on the judges. This argument, however, does not lead to the necessity of terminating the currently existing mechanism of verification of declarations, rather to the necessity of ensuring that there are appropriate guarantees against abuse.

53. It is normal and necessary that judges should be governed by special rules as regards the manner in which they are appointed, promoted or dismissed from their positions. The Constitution of Ukraine provides for a special mechanism in this regard, with the High Council of Justice (the HCJ) at its center. However, in their capacity as citizens, judges are subjected to ordinary laws and regulations (on property, town planning, tax, civil status, traffic rules and so on). In their capacity as public officials, they have the obligation to submit a financial declaration. This duty is unrelated to the exercise of *the judicial function* but follows from the judge's status as a public official and is indeed an essential guarantee in the eyes of the public that the judicial function – as all other state functions – is exercised by individuals who meet the requirements of integrity. It is therefore an important precondition for ensuring public trust in the judiciary. The Venice Commission has always been wary of rules which exempt judges from the general legal regime and repeatedly warned about the risk of judicial corporatism, cronyism and self-protection amongst judges.³¹ It stressed that judges should only enjoy *functional* immunity, i.e. directly related to the performance of judicial functions.³² In the Commission's opinion, there is no compelling justification for setting up a special legal regime for checking the financial declarations of judges. However, when subjecting judges to an obligation to submit financial declarations, the legislature should provide for guarantees against the risk that such an obligation is abused in an attempt to unduly exercise pressure and influence pending cases. But whether or not a risk of such abuses exists largely depends on the powers of this body conducting verifications. As shown above, in the Ukrainian system the NACP has only fact-finding competences; the final decision on the substance of its findings belongs to a court in the framework of administrative or criminal proceedings, or, in the context of disciplinary proceedings, to a body of judicial governance (the HCJ for ordinary judges and the CCU for judges of this court).

54. In this respect, the Venice Commission has noted that some judges of the CCU have alleged to have been subjected to abusive conduct by NACP officers in excess of their powers. However,

³⁰ For example, this is the case in Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Republic of Moldova, and Romania.

³¹ See, for example, Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2016)007, Rule of Law Checklist, para. 82; see also CDL-AD(2002)012, Opinion on the Draft Revision of the Romanian Constitution, para. 66, CDL-AD(2014)006, Joint opinion of the Venice Commission and the Directorate of Human Rights (DHR) of the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law of the Council of Europe, and of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) on the draft law on disciplinary liability of judges of the Republic of Moldova, paras. 46 and 48, CDL-AD(2014)007, Joint opinion on the draft law amending and supplementing the judicial code (evaluation system for judges) of Armenia, para. 70.

³² See Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2010)004, Report on the Independence of the Judicial System Part I: The Independence of Judges, para. 61. The Committee of Ministers Resolution (97) 24 on the twenty Guiding Principles for the fight against corruption calls Member states to limit immunities regarding investigation of corruption-related offences "to the degree necessary in a democratic society" (principle 6).

these allegations refer to abuses which, if proven, would engage the individual responsibility of the relevant NACP officers. These allegations do not justify that the NACP powers as provided by the 2014 Law as such should be removed. Instead, judges should be able to complain about such abuses, and if the existing avenues are insufficient appropriate mechanisms may be designed to tackle this problem – see the following section which proposes several options for such mechanisms.

c. How to reform the mechanism of control of financial declarations of judges?
Possible role for the HQCJ

55. As demonstrated in the previous paragraphs, the reasoning of the CCU far from clear. As a result, the legislature enjoys a large margin of appreciation as to how to implement this decision. The main concern of the CCU is that the powers of the NACP – defined in the decision as an “executive body” – may represent a danger for the judges’ independence when used for ulterior purposes. Thus, the Verkhovna Rada should reform the mechanism of verification of declarations by judges in order to reduce (if not exclude completely) this risk.

56. There are several ways how to proceed. The legislature may consider:

- increasing the independence of the NACP and improving public control over this body exercised by the Public Council (for more details on this see paragraph 58 below);
- reviewing some of the broadly formulated investigative powers of the NACP;
- giving a supervisory role over the NACP to a judicial body; or
- a combination of the above.

57. First of all, the independence of the NACP from the executive and legislative branches should be enhanced as recommended by GRECO, which prompted to develop “appropriate measures, including of a regulatory nature to enhance the independence and impartiality of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP) decision-making structures; and (ii) lay down detailed, clear and objective rules governing NACP’s work, in particular, its investigative tasks, in order to fully secure transparency and accountability in practice of NACP action”.³³ This recommendation is still relevant – see the Compliance Report of 2020 by GRECO.³⁴

58. The Venice Commission notes that the 2014 Law, as amended, already contains provisions prohibiting any interference with the activities of the NACP by state officials, political parties, etc. The NACP is supervised by a Public Council composed of representatives of various anti-corruption NGOs. The Public Council gives opinions on the annual reports of the NACP. An external evaluation of the activities of the NACP is conducted every two years by an Independent Performance Review Commission, the members of which are also in part proposed by international donors. The law contains provisions ensuring the transparency of the work of the NACP for the general public. There are further ways of making the instruments of public control over the activities of the NACP more efficient or increasing the independence and impartiality of the NACP in practice, as stressed in the Compliance Report of 2020 by GRECO

59. An additional avenue would be to identify powers of the NACP which are particularly prone to abuse. The NACP is not a law-enforcement agency and therefore cannot conduct searches, seizures, wiretapping, cannot compel individuals to testify, etc. However, the catalogue of its fact-finding powers is quite extensive (see Articles 11 and 12 of the 2014 Law). Some of these powers could be formulated more precisely and narrowly – or special exceptions and procedural safeguards in respect of the use of certain powers vis-à-vis judges can be envisaged. That being said, this recommendation should not be interpreted as inviting the Ukrainian authorities to

³³ See GRECO, Fourth Evaluation Round (Corruption prevention in respect of members of parliament, judges and prosecutors, Evaluation Report Ukraine, 2017, p. 31.

³⁴ See GRECO, Compliance Report on the Fourth Evaluation Round, GrecoRC4(2019)28, p. 14 – 16.

reduce investigative powers of the NACP: these powers should be sufficient to enable the NACP to collect information and verify declarations of public officials.

60. Finally, decision no. 13-r/2020 may be construed as requiring to give judicial bodies a role in the process of verification of declarations of their peers. The Venice Commission does not consider that every procedural step of the NACP in the process of verification of declarations of judges should be authorised by a court or another judicial body. That does not follow from any applicable (international) standard as outlined above and it would paralyse the work of the NACP which is clearly unwarranted.

61. By contrast, some elements of *ex post* supervision of the activities of the NACP in respect of judges could be introduced into the law. The Venice Commission emphasises that supervision of the fact-finding activities of the NACP in respect of judges is not required by international standards, and there are strong doubts as to whether it is required by the Ukrainian Constitution. However, the legislature could consider introducing elements of external supervision of the activities of the NACP in an attempt to accommodate decision no. 13-r/2020.

62. Such *ex post* supervision can take different forms. First of all, a “complaints mechanism” can be created, enabling judges to complain about abusive actions of the NACP before a judicial authority. The power to examine complaints could be assigned to a designated court. But it is necessary to ensure that the integrity of those judges who examine such complaints is beyond reproach. The Venice Commission understands that entrusting this function to a court which has not been reformed and which does not therefore enjoy public trust as regards the integrity and independence of its judges may be politically problematic, so the legislature enjoys a considerable leeway in deciding which court should be allocated these functions.

63. Another option would be to require the NACP to submit periodic reports to a judicial body. Such reports will not involve approving each individual procedure against a judge but rather contain a more generalised information about measures taken by the NACP during a given period in connection with the verification of declarations of judges.

64. The power to review such reports may be allocated to an appropriate body of judicial governance. The central body of judicial governance in Ukraine is the High Council of Justice (HCJ), regulated by the Constitution and the Law on the HCJ.³⁵ The HCJ has been reorganized in 2016.³⁶ It appears that the process of reform of this body is not completed and there are still serious concerns about the integrity of some members of the HCJ.³⁷ In addition, the HCJ is a body which takes final decisions on dismissing a judge and may therefore not be the most suitable institution to examine actions of the NACP in the process of gathering of evidence.

65. Another body of judicial governance is the High Qualification Commission of Judges – the HJC. As is known, the Ukrainian authorities made several attempts to reform the HJC. In 2019 the Verkhovna Rada adopted Law No. 193-IX, which entered into force on 7 November

³⁵ See Venice Commission, [CDL-REF\(2020\)067](#), Ukraine - Law on the High Council of Justice.

³⁶ Since 2016 the HJC has 21 member (see the current version of Article 131 of the Constitution): 10 are judges/retired judges elected by their peers, plus the President of the Supreme Court who is a member *ex officio* but who is elected to his post by judges (i.e. can also be a part of the quota of “judges elected by their peers”). The Prosecutor General and the Minister of Justice are not anymore members of the HJC. Non-judicial members represent other legal professions (prosecutors, barristers, law professors) and institutional actors (President, Rada). Overall, the composition of the HJC corresponds to the European standards in this field. For more details see <https://www.coe.int/en/web/human-rights-rule-of-law/-/assessment-of-the-2014-2018-judicial-reform-in-ukraine>

³⁷ See CDL-AD(2020)022, Ukraine – Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law (DGI) of the Council of Europe on the draft amendments to the Law 'on the Judiciary and the Status of Judges' and certain Laws on the activities of the Supreme Court and Judicial Authorities (draft Law no. 3711), para. 23.

2019.³⁸ On the same date the “old” HJC has been dissolved. By decision no. 4-p/2020 of 11 March 2020 the CCJ invalidated Law no. 193-IX,³⁹ and the HJC has not been recomposed since then. Without a “new” HJC, all judicial appointments were put on hold and some 2000 judicial posts remain vacant. In its opinion CDL-AD(2020)022 the Venice Commission urged the rapid re-establishment of the HJC.

66. On 22 June 2020 the President of Ukraine introduced Draft Law no. 3711 aimed at resolving the crisis around the HJC.⁴⁰ The thrust of Draft Law no. 3711 was to re-establish the HJC in order to relaunch the selection procedure of first and second instances judges.⁴¹ This bill was analysed by the VC in the most recent opinion on Ukraine (hereinafter the October 2020 Opinion).⁴²

67. In principle, *if* the HJC is re-established, and *if* it is composed of professional and independent members, in line with the recommendations of the October 2020 Opinion, this body could assume the function of reviewing the NACJ reports in relation to judges. The Venice Commission recalls that the HJC has already been given a very similar function: under Article 62 of the law on the Organisation of Courts and the Status of Judges,⁴³ the HJC is supposed to deal with the judges’ “declarations of integrity”. The HJC has inspectors (see Article 103) who may verify whether the assets and spending of judges corresponds to the levels of his or her declared income.⁴⁴ So, giving the HJC a supervisory function vis-à-vis the NACJ is coherent with the system of accountability in the judiciary.

68. Finally, the Venice Commission observes that the HJC has no competency to deal with the judges of the CCJ. Therefore, the legislature may provide for a different mechanism of supervision of activities of the NACJ, insofar as they aim at the verification of the financial declaration of judges of the CCJ. That being said, in the light of the unresolved question of conflict of interest in the context of decision no. 13-r/2020, the Venice Commission recommends not to give the CCJ the power to hear the reports of the NACJ, but to consider other appropriate solutions.

69. In sum, the most appropriate solution would be to entrust the supervision function in respect of ordinary judges to the HJC. This recommendation implies that it is a matter of urgency that

³⁸ The Law no. 193-IX was analysed by the Venice Commission in CDL-AD(2019)027, Ukraine - Opinion on the Legal framework in Ukraine governing the Supreme Court and judicial self-governing bodies. Law No. 193-IX changed the composition of the HJC: it would consist of 12 members appointed by the HCJ. Law no. 193 also intended to establish two new commissions – the Selection Board (the SB) for the appointment of the members of the new HJC and the Integrity and the Ethics Board (the IEB, created to supervise the behaviour of the members of both HCJ and the HJC). The SB and the IEB were conceived to have a mixed international (three members)/national (three members) composition; three national members are to be elected by the General Assembly of Judges, and three are appointed by international partners of Ukraine. The SB was supposed to serve as a filter for appointing new members of the HJC and of candidates to the judicial positions. The IEB (similarly composed) would assess the ethical behavior of the members of the HJC and of the HCJ (before appointment and during the mandate) – while the last word in disciplinary matters would belong to the HCJ.

³⁹ See Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2019)027, Ukraine - Opinion on the Legal framework in Ukraine governing the Supreme Court and judicial self-governing bodies.

⁴⁰ See Venice Commission, CDL-REF(2020)061, [Ukraine - Draft amendments to the Law "On the Judiciary and the Status of Judges" and certain laws on the activities of the Supreme Court and judicial authorities](#).

⁴¹ Draft law no. 3711 establishes a Competition Committee (somewhat similar to the Selection Board under Law No. 193-IX) for the appointment of the members of the HJC. Unlike Law No. 193-IX, draft law No. 3711 does not establish an Integrity and the Ethics Commission to examine the integrity of the members of the HCJ. The draft law no. 3711 also subordinates the HJC to the HCJ.

⁴² See Venice Commission, [CDL-AD\(2020\)022](#), Ukraine – Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law (DGI) of the Council of Europe on the draft amendments to the Law 'on the Judiciary and the Status of Judges' and certain Laws on the activities of the Supreme Court and Judicial Authorities (draft Law no. 3711).

⁴³ See CDL-REF(2020)068, Ukraine - Law on the Organisation of Courts and the Status of Judges

⁴⁴ The most recent provisions on the status and powers of the HJC can be found in the Law on the Organisation of Courts and the Status of Judges (see [CDL-REF\(2020\)068](#)).

the HQCJ be re-composed under the new rules, which ensure the appointment of sufficiently independent, honest and professional members to the HQCJ. Before such law on the HQCJ is enacted, a transitional solution may be provided in the 2014 Law.

70. The Venice Commission stresses that the development of appropriate responses to decision no. 13-r/2020 is primarily the prerogative of the Ukrainian legislature, which should decide which mechanism (a complaints mechanism or a reporting mechanism, or a combination of both) is the most appropriate in the current situation.

IV. Conclusions

71. President Zelenskyy requested an urgent opinion of the Venice Commission on the constitutional situation created by decision no. 13-r/2020 of 27 October 2020 of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. This urgent Opinion addresses the first question raised by President Zelenskyy, namely the effects of decision no. 13-r/2020 on the anti-corruption legislation. The other questions put by President Zelenskyy are addressed in the urgent Opinion on the reform of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CDL-PI(2020)019).

72. The Venice Commission stresses that the fight against corruption is an essential element in a state governed by the Rule of law, but so is respect for the Constitution and for constitutional justice. They go hand in hand. Parliament and the Executive must respect the role of the Constitutional Court as gatekeeper of the Constitution and need to implement its decisions. In turn, a Constitutional Court, like any other state institution and court, on the one hand deserves institutional respect but, on the other hand, must respect its own procedures and for the sake of constitutional stability and legal certainty, must issue decisions that are generally consistent with its own case-law. Even more importantly, a constitutional court must decide within the parameters of its legal authority and jurisdiction.

73. The Venice Commission acknowledges that decision no. 13-r/2020 of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine lacks clear reasoning, has no firm basis in international law, and was possibly tainted with a major procedural flaw – an unresolved question of a conflict of interest of some judges. This is regrettable, not only because of the immediate negative effect of this decision on the fight against corruption in Ukraine, but also because such decisions undermine public trust in constitutional justice in general.

74. Nonetheless, the constitutional role of the Constitutional Court must be respected, and the Verkhovna Rada should implement the decision by interpreting it in light of the constitutional foundations of the country and applicable international standards, preserving public interests such as the fight against corruption, including in the judiciary. In particular, it is important to keep the duty of public officials (including judges of ordinary courts and of the Constitutional Court) to submit financial declarations, to have an efficient mechanism of verifying such declarations, and to provide in the law for appropriate sanctions for those public officials – including judges and prosecutors – who knowingly submit false declarations/fail to submit declarations.

75. Against this background, the Venice Commission invites the Verkhovna Rada to consider the following solutions:

- As regards Article 366-1 of the Criminal Code, invalidated by the Constitutional Court, criminal liability for the submission of knowingly false declaration/failure to submit declaration should be restored, but the law may specify in greater detail the different sanctions corresponding to the degree of criminal responsibility, reserving, for example, the sanction of imprisonment for cases above a certain threshold and for perpetrators acting with deliberate intent;

- As regards the powers of the National Agency for Corruption Prevention (the NACP) to verify declarations, all of its powers in respect of public officials other than judges, may be restored as they are unaffected by the reasoning used by the Constitutional Court in its judgment;
- As regards the powers of the NACP vis-à-vis judges, additional safeguards may be introduced in the law to protect them from potential abuses:
 - the independence of the NACP in practice and the public control over its activities should be improved as per GRECO recommendations;
 - some of the investigative powers of the NACP may be formulated more precisely and narrowly, or special exceptions and procedural safeguards in respect of judges may be envisaged;
 - in order to shield judges from potential abuses by the NACP, the law may provide for the supervision of the activities of the NACP in respect of judges either in the form of a complaints mechanism, or in the form of regular reporting by the NACP to an appropriate judicial body.

76. On the last point the question remains which judicial body should exercise the supervision function vis-à-vis the NACP (insofar as the financial declarations of judges are concerned). In so far as the Ukrainian legislature would contemplate the establishment of a complaint mechanism, this role could be assigned to a designated court. In so far as the Ukrainian legislature would contemplate the introduction of an obligation for the NACP to periodically submit a report of its activities vis-à-vis judges, the High Qualification Commission of Judges (the HQCJ) would appear to be the most appropriate body to play this role in the Ukrainian context, because of its existing powers to verify declarations of integrity of judges. However, this solution is possible only once the HQCJ is re-established and only if it is composed of professional, honest and independent members, as per recommendations of the Opinion of the Venice Commission of October 2020 (CDL-AD(2020)022). The re-establishment of the HQCJ is therefore a priority. As regards judges of the Constitutional Court, the law may provide for another mechanism of supervision of the activities of the NACP in their regard.

77. The Venice Commission remains at the disposal of the Ukrainian authorities for further assistance in this matter.